Excerpt from the Organization of African Unity's International Panel of Eminent Personalities report "Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide." This report is still available at the oau-oua.org site but the server seems very slow. D.S. Linkname: IPEP Special Report Table of Contents URL: [4]http://www.oau-oua.org/Document/ipep/report/Rwanda-e/EN-III-T.htm Server: Microsoft-IIS/4.0 Last Mod: Sat, 08 Jul 2000 08:12:10 GMT Linkname: Chapter 12 Before the Genocide: France and the United States URL: [5]http://www.oau-oua.org/Document/ipep/report/rwanda-e/EN-12-CH.htm 12.42. Even in the midst of the genocide itself, Rwandan lives received no priority in American policy. When 10 Belgian Blue Helmets were killed by government forces the day after Habyarimana's plane went down, a panic-stricken Belgian government swiftly withdrew its entire contingent from Rwanda. Embarrassed, Belgium began lobbying for the entire UNAMIR mission to be withdrawn.[71] US Ambassador Madeleine Albright was quick to exploit this proposal. Perhaps failing to see the real significance of her own words, she suggested that a "small, skeletal" operation be left in Kigali "to show the will of the international community." "Later," she added, "the [Security] Council might see what could be done about giving it an effective mandate." In fact, this was exactly what transpired as the Security Council, in the midst of the genocide, dramatically reduced UNAMIR to a token level of 270 people and restricted its mandate to mediation and humanitarian aid.[72] This decision was taken despite strong protests to the contrary from the OAU and African governments. 12.43. Boutros-Ghali and the US clashed bitterly during his tenure, and his memoir is far harsher towards the Americans than toward the French, whose negative role in Rwanda we have discussed at length. In the next chapter, we also ask serious questions about his own role in Rwanda for at least the first month or so of the genocide. Nevertheless, we are persuaded by corroborating evidence that Boutros-Ghali's description of US policy during this period is essentially accurate: "It was one thing for the United States to place conditions on its own participation in UN peacekeeping. It was something else entirely for the US to attempt to impose its conditions on other countries. Yet that is what Madeleine Albright did. With the publication of PDD 25, she argued with members of the Security Council for the new Clinton conditions to apply before Resolution 918 of May 17, 1994, which increased the strength and expanded the mandate of UNAMIR, was carried out. For example, a cease-fire should be in place; the parties should agree to a UN presence; UNAMIR should not engage in peace enforcement unless what was happening in Rwanda was a significant threat to international peace and security. Were the troops, funds and equipment available? What was the 'exit strategy'?"[73] 12.44. On May 9, an informal proposal raised the possibility of a UN force of some 4,000 soldiers. The American response was presented by Albright: "We have serious reservations about proposals to establish a large peace- enforcement mission which would operate throughout Rwanda with a mandate to end the fighting, restore law and order, and pacify the population....It is unclear what the peace- enforcement mission would be or when it would end." This was a shocking statement, since it was perfectly obvious the purpose was to stop the genocide. But since the Clinton Administration would take any steps to avoid acknowledging that a genocide was in fact taking place, its spokespeople were forced right into June to resort publicly to weasel words about "acts of genocide" that made them look ridiculous to the rest of the world -- except, of course, to peers on the Security Council who had adopted the same shameful position.[74] 12.45. But looking ridiculous seemed preferable to the alternative. One senior official who participated in Administration discussions of this matter later explained that "if we acknowledged it was genocide, that was mandated in international law that the US had to do something....If we acknowledged it was genocide and didn't do anything...what [would be] the impact on US foreign policy relations with the rest of the world following inaction after admitting it's genocide..."[75] 12.46. But there was yet another consideration as well, as Tony Marley, Political Military Adviser to the US State Department, later revealed. At one of the series of meetings Marley attended where the Clinton policy was being thrashed out, "One Administration official asked...what possible impact there might be on the Congressional elections scheduled for later that year were the government to acknowledge that genocide was taking place in Rwanda and yet the Administration be seen as doing nothing about it. The concern seemed to be that this might cost the President's political party votes in the election and therefore should be factored into the consideration as to whether or not 'genocide' could be used as a term....[This] indicated to me that the calculation was based on whether or not there was popular pressure to take action rather than taking action because it was the right thing to do."[76] 12.47. Finally, the Security Council did approve UNAMIR II with 5,500 troops and an expanded mandate. But, Boutros-Ghali tells us, "Albright employed the requirements of PDD 25 to pressure the other Security Council members to delay the deployment of the full 5,500-man contingent to Rwanda until I could satisfy her that all of the many US conditions had been met.... The US effort to prevent the effective deployment of a UN force for Rwanda succeeded, with the strong support of [the Thatcher government in] Britain. The international community did little or nothing as the killing in Rwanda continued."[77] Let us say that this Panel considers it beyond belief, a scandal of the most shocking kind, that the genocide was ended before a single Blue Helmet representing UNAMIR II ever materialized. 12.48. Boutros-Ghali goes out of his way in his memoir to show that Madeleine Albright was simply being a good Clinton team player throughout this period of betrayed opportunities. She would not have taken her obstructionist positions, "I felt sure, without clear authorization from the White House. As the Rwandan genocide continued, she was apparently just following orders."[78] But of course that was exactly the point. As the Clinton Cabinet member directly responsible for the UN, Albright chose to follow orders, even if the consequences for hundreds of thousands of Rwandans were fatal, as it was certain they would be. So far as we can determine, not a single member of any government or any institution most directly responsible for letting the genocide happen has ever resigned on principle. 12.49. In May 1994, five weeks into the slaughter, an influential American journal acknowledged that what was happening in Rwanda was indeed a genocide, a catastrophe far beyond that of Bosnia, which was then at the top of the international agenda. But there would be no US intervention, it accurately predicted, since Rwanda's "chaos may trigger a parallel disaster in ... Burundi, but nowhere else," while American neutrality in the Balkans might destabilize "strategically vital parts of the world."[79] __________________________________ [71] Senat de Belgique, rapport fait au nom de la commission d'enquete par MM. Mahoux et Verhofstadt, session de 1997-1998, Commission d'enquete parlementaire concernant les evenements du Rwanda, no.1-611/7, annexes no. 1-611/8 a 15, (Belgique: Senat de Belgique, 6 decembre 1997), 525; Des Forges, 177; Millwood, Study 2, 44. [72] Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished. [73] Ibid. [74] "Triumph of Evil", the Frontline documentary. [75] Tony Marley, Frontline interview. [76] Ibid. [77] Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished. [78] Ibid. [79] "Why no Rwanda," The New Republic editorial, 16 May 1994.