Welcome to Colombia,
Where War is the Continuation of the Drug Industry by Any Other Means
Possibly nowhere else on earth at the moment does the phrase
"bureaucratization of war" apply more clearly than in Colombia's Civil
War.
This conflict is conducted through weekly massacres that
tally up between
20 to 40 corpses to an already immense body count. The requisite
extortions, (including kidnaping of minors) and sabotage of communication
infrastructures and oil pipelines are also regular features, while combat
operations ranging from small guerrilla units to battalion-sized task
forces are so common they are rarely mentioned outside media circles.
This war is not being waged only by illiterate peasants wishing to toss
out the yoke of an unbending oligarchy. College-educated folk, along with
professionals of all kinds, abound among the 17,000 strong FARC
(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) guerrillas. The ELN (National
Liberation Army) commands some 5000 combatants.
The right-wing paramilitary gangs, organized around
the AUC, or United
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, rack up a few extra thousand combatants
of their own. Their origins go back several decades as cattle ranchers,
mining concerns and others organized armed vigilante groups to enforce
their control in rural areas. Thanks to their ties to some units of the
Colombian military and drug money, they've grown into a relatively large
force. Their human rights record is abysmal. The paramilitaries claim
to be a sort of auxiliary force to the army in the fight against the guerillas.
In reality, they're little more than brigade-size death squads, specializing
in
massacring civilians suspected of being guerilla sympathizers.
These irregular forces operate in addition to the Colombian
army, drug
police and intelligence services (or are pitted against them, in the case
of the guerillas), which command large resources as well. In the past,
drug
cartels, cattle ranchers, coffee growers and mining companies had their
own armed gangs. These days they find it more expedient to rent portions
of any of the irregular armies for the "protection" of their respective
industries. Only the usual left- wing fanatics-in both North America and
Colombia-buy the guerrillas' self-righteous denials of their participation
in the drug industry. The cartels, like other sectors who work in or around
the war zones, have learned to keep a low profile. Almost anybody who
wants to do business in this country must come prepared to pay the usual
"war taxes" or "contributions" demanded by the irregular armies. In this
sense, Colombia's war resembles a Mafia feud over territory more
than than a Low Intensity Conflict.
Unfortunately for the civilians caught in the middle, the
suffering has
been grievous. Those who live in the relative safety of Bogota, the
capital, have learned to ignore reality while hypocritically claiming
that
Colombia's troubles are not so bad in comparison to other parts of the
world. This smug attitude does not stop Bogotanos from daily lining up
in
large numbers around the embassies of certain countries to apply for visas.
In the meantime, the current military offensive has given the Colombian
army reason to celebrate: members of the Irish Republican Army who were
training the FARC were captured while trying to leave the country. A number
of FARC task forces have been effectively dismantled. Several top guerrilla
field commanders have been killed in combat. The effectiveness of air
cavalry operations through deployment of helicopter assaults and paratroopers
will force the guerrillas to rethink their military strategy.
Both sides understand that, as long as a corridor cannot
be established
between guerrilla-controlled areas in the so-called Buffer Zone, or Zona
de Distención, and Bogota, no one will have a decisive military
advantage, and the bloodletting will go on forever. In large urban areas
guerrilla
presence is negligible, mostly limited to extortion and the odd bombing.
So, what are the prospects for a resolution to this mess? Right now, it
would take truly paranormal powers to decipher this riddle. Basically,
everyone has decided that no peace agreement will be reached with the
current government. National elections are scheduled for next year, and
none of the serious contenders for the presidency sees any other option
than to keep talking with the guerrillas. Even the army has ruled out
a
military solution for the time being.
As the Colombian Constitution does not allow re-election,
the current
government of President Pastrana is paving the way for its successor with
a series of measures designed to force a settlement of the conflict: a
new
law gives wider powers of arrest and interrogation to security forces,
more
troops are being deployed into conflict zones, and the spraying of
suspected Coca producing fields is to be stepped up. My Colombian
colleagues find this approach counterproductive and futile. They point
out
that few people in either the producing or the consuming countries seem
to
be interested in curtailing the flow of so-called Precursor Substances,
which are used in the chemical processing of Coca from leafy bundles into
the stuff going up the noses of countless users. These substances have
a
dual-use component, meaning they can also have legitimate purposes.
Nevertheless, my colleagues remind me, this dual-use argument has
effectively been articulated to prevent Iraq from importing a number of
materials which could have a military application.
Money-laundering around the world through banking and investment activities is another area where duplicity seems to be the name of the game. Usually all Colombians hear on this issue are the grandiose pronouncements from visiting dignitaries, with the corresponding photo ops. Recently, several local and internationally respected publications have openly questioned approaches to the drug industry which place the overwhelming burden of control on producing countries, while doing little to reverse patterns of consumption at home. Others have gone further, in suggesting that the time to consider legalization has come.
There are of course many views on the issue of legalization.
One thing is
certain, however: the drug industry has profoundly affected everything
and
everyone in this nation, corrupting whoever could be corrupted and denying
legitimacy to the entire edifice of government. Even the guerrillas, once
dissenters with a vision of an alternative society, have become little
more than armed thugs in the service of the drug establishment. Those
who do not side with any of the irregular armies, yet try to voice alternative
points of view, are hunted down mercilessly by all sides. Teachers, municipal
authorities, union leaders, human rights activists, indigenous people,
journalists, professors and student leaders are among the victims of paramilitary
activity which the Colombian government is unable or unwilling to stop.
In the foreseeable future all these subterranean forces
must be taken into
account when considering the prospects for a resolution to this war. The
minority which is pontificating about the possibility of direct U.S.
military involvement in this country is hallucinating in the grandest
of
senses. With a surface of more than one million square kilometers and
a
forbidding topography, Colombia is no Central America. The last 40 years
of conflict have made brutally clear to any prospective yahoo that this
country cannot be controlled via military might alone. The most elemental
political calculation demands prudence when devising possible military
scenarios for direct U.S. involvement in this conflict. Even George W.
can
read this cue card without missing a syllable.
As Plan Colombia demonstrates, this certainly does not prevent some form of participation in the conflict, mostly through equipment and technical assistance which gives Americans a fair amount of political leverage. Such leverage is by no means unrestricted, for the Colombian government is no South Vietnamese or Central American Client State. As usual the Europeans, unable or unwilling to offer a viable alternative to the current U.S. involvement in the overall peace process, continue to complain about American intervention, while doing little to stop the carnage. For their part, the Americans continue to hedge their bets and regularly train division-size military contingents in other countries which have areas with distinct similarities to the Buffer Zone. No one should act surprised at this. For once a military approach is agreed upon, the only logical way to pursue it is through military means. At this point though, few if any signs are clear as to what the next move is on this giant chess board.
The mist will begin to clear only after the new Colombian
government is
inaugurated next year. The results of the 2002 Congressional elections
in
the U.S. will also heavily influence the direction of the overall strategy
towards Colombia. All of this will do little to change the overall
socioeconomic dynamic of this society, which is moving unequivocally toward
the Brazilian economic model, with no limits as to how high or how low
people can move along the quality of life divide. The time of reckoning
for Colombia is intrinsically related to the hideous social disparities
which
permeate this society. These scandalous inequalities will furnish the
drug
industry and all other actors in this conflict with a steady supply of
recruits for a long time to come.